THE CONTESTED TRINITY: SOLOMON ISLANDS, TAIWAN & CHINA

Dr. Tarcisius Kabutaulaka

I had earlier planned to write a piece on how the changing regional order will impact Solomon Islands.

However, given discussions in the past weeks about the possibility that Solomon Islands might switch diplomatic relations from Taiwan to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), I have decided to focus on the Solomon Islands/Taiwan/China issue.

From what I gathered, there is a push by some Cabinet Ministers and backbenchers in the Solomon Islands Government for the country to abandon Taipei and forge diplomatic relations with Beijing.

To address this issue, I am writing two articles. This first piece provides a background of the relationships between Solomon Islands, Taiwan and PRC. It offers a context to our understanding of and discussions about these relationships.

My second piece will focus on the current discussions: the rationale for the push to switch, the implications for Solomon Islands, and an outline of issues that should be considered.

This is an important issue that must be seriously considered, discussed and any decision must be well informed. The government must not rush or be casual in its decision because this will have long-term impact on the country and peoples’ livelihoods.

The government must consult widely. Remember, the authority to decide comes with the responsibility to consult, gather quality information, and reflect on the potential impacts on the country.

FRIENDS TO ALL, ENEMY TO NONE

At the time of its independence in 1978, the Solomon Islands’ foreign policy slogan was “friend to all, and enemy to none”. While catchy, inclusive, and perhaps suitable for a newly independent nation-state trying to establish itself in the international arena, this did not say much about the issues that informed the country’s foreign policy. If anything, it demonstrated a naive perception of its role in the international arena, one heavily influenced at the time by the bipolar divisions between the East (represented by communism) and West (represented by neoliberal democracy).

At that time, who Pacific Island countries like Solomon Islands interacted with was influenced (if not dictated) by their “traditional friends” and former or existing colonial powers—Great Britain, Australia, United States, New Zealand, and France. These metropolitan countries were determined to keep the Pacific a “Western lake” and developed a policy of “strategic denial” to exclude “communists” entirely from the region. The newly independent island nations were regarded as immature and therefore not ready to deal with communist countries.

However, many of the Pacific Island countries were eager to express their independence, especially in foreign relations. Vanuatu, for example, joined the Non- Aligned Movement and established links with Libya, despite being chastised by western countries. Similarly, Kiribati defied the advice of its traditional allies when it signed a fishing agreement with the former Soviet Union in 1985.

Solomon Islands was also keen to forge new relationships. For example, in 1983, in an article titled “Solomon Islands looks to Southeast Asia,” published in the Solomon Star (7 January 1983) the then Prime Minister Solomon Mamaloni, described the assistance of “traditional friends” as “boring” and said that the Solomon Islands should explore relations with countries with backgrounds similar to its own, like Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, mainland China, Taiwan, India, and Bangladesh.

Perhaps Mamaloni thought that Solomon Islands could live its foreign policy mantra and be a “friend to all and enemy to none.”

TAIWAN OR CHINA?

In the early 1980s Solomon Islands began debating whether to establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan or China.

At that time the country had cordial relations with both governments, although it seemed more likely that diplomatic relations would be established with Beijing.

China had embassies in Canberra and Port Moresby and was actively attempting to entice Honiara into a relationship.

In April 1982, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ezekiel Alebua, visited China to initiate talks that would eventually lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations. Alebua met with Deputy Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Huan Hua, and the two signed an initial communiqué.

On his return, Alebua said, “a good foundation has been laid for future sound diplomatic and trade relations between both countries.”

On 10 April 1982 a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed in Honiara to pave the way for the development of trade between Solomon Islands and PRC.

The MOU involved the Solomon Islands Copra Board and a five-man trade team from the National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation of the PRC.

While this was going on, the Solomon Islands government was also warming up to Taipei. In June 1982 a Taiwanese trade exhibition was held in Honiara, the result of a visit by a group of Solomon Islands government officials to Taiwan in February and March of that year.

Solomon Islands Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs, Kamilo Teke, was impressed by the exhibit, which featured agricultural machinery, and later became an enthusiastic proponent of relations with Taiwan.

By the beginning of 1983 interactions with Taipei were becoming more serious, and in March of that year a Taiwanese consular-level office was established in Honiara.

Despite this development, the then Minister of Finance, Bartholomew Ulufa’alu, insisted that the Solomon Islands government “recognizes mainland China as the sole representative of the people of China,” and that the relationship with Taiwan concentrated “mainly on promotion of investment, trade, and economic cooperation.”

Despite Ulufa’alu’s assurances, on 26 May 1983 the Taiwanese consular office was upgraded to embassy level and Suen His-tzung appointed the first Taiwanese ambassador to the Solomon Islands.

According to the Solomon Islands Government newsletter, Government Monthly, “Mr. Suen said both governments also agreed to develop friendly relations and mutual cooperation for the purpose of raising mutual benefit from each other in the fi elds of trade and investment, technical and cultural exchanges.”

The Solomon Islands government emphasized trade and investment as the major reasons for developing its relations with Taiwan.

For example, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Dennis Lulei, noted that, “Taiwan could help Solomon Islands get a soft loan from the ADB since it is a member of the bank. It would also encourage Taiwanese investors.”

He said that Taiwan might also help to fund a new international airport and provide patrol boats.

However, Taipei’s emphasis was on securing diplomatic recognition that would give it legitimacy in the international arena.

Beijing was disappointed when the Solomon Islands established diplomatic relations with Taipei. In April 1983 the Chinese embassy in Australia expressed surprise over the move to establish consular-level relations with Taiwan.

On 18 August 1983, Chinese Ambassador to Papua New Guinea, Hu Hongfan, visited Honiara for a two-day round of talks with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

He emphasized that his country would not establish diplomatic relations unless the Taiwanese Consulate-General in Honiara was downgraded to a commercial office.

Solomon Islands Government officials told the Chinese that it was prepared to accommodate both countries based on its foreign policy of being a “friend to all and enemy to none.”

Despite that, Beijing continued to encourage Honiara to break relations with Taipei. In September 1983, a six-man delegation led by the then Speaker of the National Parliament, Maepeza Gina, was invited to visit China. The Government Monthly reported that the aim of the mission was “to observe their parliamentary system and how it works.” It was also to visit industrial areas and observe social and economic developments.

While in Beijing, the visiting delegation was told that “establishing diplomatic relation with Taiwan is an act of interference with [China’s] internal affairs.” Consequently, high-level Chinese officials refused to meet with them.

The delegation leader, Maepeza Gina, reported that they were “unable to observe the Chinese Parliamentary system as much as expected because of major differences between the country’s Parliamentary system and Solomon Islands parliamentary set up.”

But he said that they were able to visit many agricultural development areas, educational institutions, and cultural centers before returning home.

He also mentioned endorsing a document on possible assistance in the building of a new Solomon Islands National Parliament and a national sports stadium.

In response to Beijing’s expression of disappointment, Prime Minister Mamaloni said his government would establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan because it did not want communism: “Leaders of the People’s Republic of China (Communist China) must understand that Solomon Islands people do not accept communism because they wish to enjoy the freedom of democracy and the traditional values they have survived under for many years. It is for this reason that the Solomon Islands Government has established diplomatic relations with only countries who have shared the same democratic relations.”

Mamaloni said that nothing had been achieved from the visits to China and emphasized that the Solomon Islands must benefit tangibly from diplomatic relationships.

Interestingly, Solomon Islands had established diplomatic ties with Taiwan four months prior to the Maepeza Gina–led delegation’s visit to China. Hence, the decision to forge relations with Taipei could not have been influenced by the fact that nothing tangible came out of that visit.

CONTESTED TRINITY

By the late 1980s, Solomon Islands had become one of Taiwan’s most trusted allies in the region.

For the Taiwanese, this provided much-needed diplomatic recognition. For the Solomon Islands, the expectation was that the relationship would lead to improved investment, trade, and budgetary assistance. There was also an expectation that the Solomon Islands could learn from Taiwan’s development experience and benefit from its technology, especially in agriculture. 

Solomon Islands’ relationship with Taiwan has attracted a lot of attention, especially Taipei’s contributions to the Rural Constituency Development Funds (RCDF), which some have argued has contributed to the corruption of Solomon Islands political culture.

Taipei promises to tighten the governance of its contribution, which actually makes up for a small percentage of the total funds that are directly accessible to politicians.

At the same time, Taipei is conscious of the declining number of countries that recognize it. Out of the seventeen countries that currently recognize Taiwan, six are Pacific Islanders. Solomon Islands is an important partner.

I hope the above provides a useful historical overview of the Solomon Islands/Taiwan/China trinity.

My next piece will focus on the current discussion